2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-7-2009

Catherine Walsh v. John Quinn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009

Recommended Citation
"Catherine Walsh v. John Quinn" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1392.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1392

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3884
___________
CATHERINE WALSH,
Appellant
v.
JOHN QUINN; FRANCIS J. KLEMENSIC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-00328)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 27, 2009
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Catherine Walsh challenges the District Court’s dismissal of her
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and denial of her
motion for leave to amend her complaint. For the reasons below, we will affirm the

District Court’s orders.
I.
In 2000, Walsh, who was then represented by counsel, filed a medical malpractice
suit in the Erie County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas. Judge John A. Bozza
presided over the case and John Quinn and Francis Klemensic represented defendants
Dennis Borozon, M.D. and St. Vincent Health Center. On June 4, 2004, three days before
the trial was to begin, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Four days later,
Walsh moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The trial court denied Walsh’s
motion and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. On July 11, 2005,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Two-and-one-half years later, on November 26, 2007, Walsh filed the current
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
She alleges that Quinn and Klemensic—the attorneys for the defendants in her state
case—conspired with Judge Bozza to interfere with her due process rights. Walsh asserts
that in 2003 Bozza formed a medical malpractice workgroup in response to a medical
malpractice case he had presided over in which the jury awarded substantial damages to
the plaintiff. According to Walsh, Bozza named Quinn and Klemensic to the workgroup,
and throughout 2003 and 2004, “upon information and belief,” they had ex parte
communications about her case. She believes that “Quinn and Klemensic along with
Bozza acted unlawfully together to violate [her] rights by making sure that her case was
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terminated in favor of the defendants. Quinn and Klemensic had to have worked with
Judge Bozza to end the case improperly.”
The District Court, upon motion by Quinn and Klemensic, dismissed Walsh’s case.
The District Court first determined that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.1 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The District Court then found that,
even if it did have jurisdiction, Walsh’s conspiracy claim, as assessed under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, failed because she did not plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that Quinn and
Klemensic could be treated as having acted “under color of state law.”
Ten days after the District Court dismissed her complaint, Walsh’s counsel sought
to withdraw from the case and Walsh filed pro se a motion for reconsideration and for
leave to file an amended complaint. Walsh asserted that she should be allowed to amend
her complaint because she “ha[d] new information which she feels will strongly impact
the case against defendants Quinn and Klemensic.” On September 8, 2008, the District
Court denied Walsh’s motions. Walsh now appeals.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over an
order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch.
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We need not address the District Court’s ruling pursuant to the RookerFeldman Doctrine because we are affirming on other grounds.
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Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004). “We accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and will affirm . . . only if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any
set of facts which could be proved.” Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
As the District Court explained, a claim for a violation of civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 can be sustained only if a defendant has deprived a plaintiff of a federal
constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state law. Kaucher v. County
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). Walsh claims that Quinn and Klemensic
acted under color of state law by conspiring Judge Bozza, a state actor. To allege such a
conspiracy, the complaint must specifically present facts tending to show agreement and
concerted action to deprive the plaintiff of his or her rights. Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904
F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1990); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980).
Assuming Walsh’s allegations to be true, as we must, and viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Walsh, we conclude that there is no set of facts from which we
can infer an understanding among Judge Bozza, Quinn, and Klemensic to deprive Walsh
of her constitutional rights. Walsh attempts to tie Judge Bozza’s and the lawyers’
involvement with the medical malpractice workgroup—which she suggests was formed to
curb plaintiffs’ damages in medical malpractice cases—to supposed ex parte
conversations about her case, to the dismissal of her case. However, she presents nothing
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more than vague inferences and ambiguous allegations. And as the District Court
articulated in its opinion, mere allegations of joint action or a conspiracy are not sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss. See Crabtree, 904 F.2d at 1476. In sum, as nothing in the
complaint demonstrates the existence of any concerted effort between Judge Bozza and
the attorneys, we agree with the District Court’s determination that Walsh failed to
demonstrate that the attorneys acted under color of state law. It was thus appropriate for
the District Court to dismiss Walsh’s complaint.
Walsh also complains that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to amend her complaint, which she filed after the District Court dismissed her
case. As Walsh points out, refusals to grant leave to amend are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
However, “[a]lthough Rule 15 vests the District Court with considerable discretion to
permit amendment ‘freely . . .when justice so requires,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the
liberality of the rule is no longer applicable once judgment has been entered. At that
stage, Rules 59 and 60 govern the opening of final judgments,” and amendment is not
allowed unless the judgment is set aside or vacated under one of those rules. Ahmed v.
Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1489).
Walsh filed her motion for reconsideration within ten days of the District Court’s
dismissal of her case; however, neither Rule 59 nor Rule 60(b) provides relief. She failed
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to demonstrate any basis for granting her motion, such as an applicable intervening
change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error of law or fact, or manifest injustice.
See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover,
Walsh did not allege any new facts when proposing to file an amended complaint—she
stated only that she “has new information which she feels will strongly impact the case
against defendants Quinn and Klemensic.” The District Court thus did not abuse its
discretion by denying Walsh’s motion to amend her complaint after her case had been
dismissed.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.
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